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Democracy for Idiots. Republicanism, 
Self-Alienation and Permanent Minorities
DAVID ÁLVAREZ
Abstract
The main thesis can be summarized the following way: If freedom-status is the master good 
for republicans then, when democratic participation and mandatory citizenship undermine 
the self-respect of permanent minorities, self-alienation becomes a political status 
compatible with the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination. By self-alienation I 
understand the voluntary withdrawal of active democratic participation, the rejection of 
national membership as citizen, and the assumption of the status of permanent resident. 
The paper argues that permanent residency and national citizenship must be conceived 
as equivalent statuses in terms of non-domination and therefore, as compatible forms of 
democratic equality.
Keywords: democratic equality, democratic republicanism, mandatory citizenship, Pettit, 
self-alienation, political idiocy.
Democracy for idiots addresses the case of a democratic society that has to accommodate a substantial number of “idiots” within. For classic Athenians, idiotes were those citizens that voluntarily 
withdraw from participation in public life. Needless to mention that these 
Athenian idiots were native free males that may have reasons to avoid 
discussing and deciding public affairs among other native free males. I try 
to rescue this somehow controversial figure of the “idiot” to examine the 
case when one has private or public reasons to withdraw from the public 
role of active citizenship. 
The idiotes represents a very illuminating figure for our contem-
porary democracies. He exhibits a dual profile, on the one hand, it can be 
someone with an idiosyncratic set of self-regarding priorities. On the other 
hand, the idiotes may be the figure of the conscientious self-alienation 
of someone who is aware of the structural limitation of the democratic 
system. For instance, one that knows that the Athenian demos is intrin-
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sically biased against any reasonable discussion of fair laws regarding 
gender, slavery, or foreign policy.
Similarly, our complex democracies also present structural limita-
tions for the adequate representation of deeply held minority viewpoints 
that makes the rejection of active citizenship a reasonable option for many 
individuals. Self-Alienation however, cannot be reduced to other forms 
of civil disobedience or conscientious objection. These figures are typi-
cally the ultimate patriots. They express the highest loyalty to the cons-
titutional principles by not recognizing deviating norms while accepting 
the punishment for the infringement. They deeply identify with their civic 
identity and operate within the system that they try to reform. In contrast, 
political idiots make explicit a democratic fissure that is beyond repair 
from the inside and opt instead for exercising resistance through distance.
In particular, the paper analyses Phillip Pettit’s republicanism as one 
of the most sophisticated and influential conceptions of democracy, and 
argues that self-alienation is a way of exercising exit within the state that 
is compatible with this conception of republican freedom.
The main thesis can be summarized the following way: If free-
dom-status is the master good for republicans then, when democratic 
participation and mandatory citizenship undermine the self-respect of 
permanent minorities, self-alienation becomes a political status compa-
tible with the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination. By self-
-alienation I understand the voluntary withdrawal of active democratic 
participation, the rejection of national membership as citizen, and the 
assumption of the status of permanent resident. The paper argues that 
permanent residency and national citizenship must be conceived as equi-
valent statuses in terms of non-domination and therefore, as compatible 
forms of democratic equality.1
The following sections proceed by (1) showing the fundamental 
place of freedom-status and self-respect for a republican conception of 
democracy. Then, it continues by showing the connection between (2) 
1. For the purpose of this paper my main reference will be Pettit’s restatement of his views 
in On the People’s Terms. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). This is the 
most coherent and consolidated version of his republican thought. In Just Freedom. A 
Moral Compass for a Complex World (New York: Norton, 2014) Pettit expands his views 
on contemporary topics for a broader audience. It is however, in A Theory of Freedom. 
From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency (Cambridge: Polity, 2001, 156) when he 
explicitly discards “exit within the state” as a possibility and justifies focusing on “the 
voice of authorisation and contestation that is available to ordinary people under de-
mocratic arrangements.”
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democratic legitimacy, (3) distributive justice and self-respect. Next, it 
addresses the problem of self-respect for permanent minorities that (4) 
lack authorial power in democratic deliberations, and (5) editorial power 
for democratic contestation. Afterwards, it presents (6) the connection 
between dignity, status and political equality, (7) rejects mandatory citi-
zenship as a plausible realization of democratic equality and (8) defends 
self-alienation as a form of democratic equivalence of status. 
1. Freedom-status in republican theory
The republican conception defends an ideal of public freedom as 
non-domination which in turn is understood as controlled interference.2 
There is interference because the common institutions of a democratic 
state exercise shared coercion on our reciprocal freedoms, frustrating 
under its authority the range of our actions. They therefore constrain the 
universe of our choices, the space of our decisions and our capacity to act 
on them. However, we find moral reasons to incorporate ourselves under 
the coercive institutions of a democratic state because republican societies 
exercise this coercion on the people’s terms, and controlled by the people 
itself. It can therefore provide an otherwise unobtainable “public good,” 
the “freedom-status” that allows the dignity of equal public persons.3 
This “freedom status” is illustrated by what Pettit dubs as the 
“eye-to-eye (eyeball) test”.4 With this expression Pettit aims to capture the 
perception of equal self-value and fundamental self-respect that allows a 
citizen to conduct her public interactions looking in the eye at her fellow 
co-citizens, without shying away due to fear or deference. This test sets the 
level of transfer and social provision of resources instrumental to achieve 
this relational status and for the promotion of those personal capacities 
and attitudes conducive to this public disposition. 
The “eye-to-eye test” is successful when every citizen recognizes each 
other as sharing an equal chance in shaping the terms in which common 
life is organized. Therefore, freedom-status is both an outcome of the 
institutions of public freedom, and the dispositional attitude to create 
them. This is the recursive paradox that haunts republicanism. It presu-
pposes that the institutions are given by an outsider, a mythical legislator 
2. Philip Pettit, On the People’s Terms, 153.
3. Ibid., 83-84, 181-184.
4. Ibid., 84-87.
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with civic qualities beyond common people, and is therefore latently aris-
tocratic. Or otherwise assumes that people already are equally virtuous, 
and then subjection to shared coercion is redundant. Pettit tries to argue 
himself out of this puzzle by justifying the epistemic virtues of (enforced) 
social coordination, which would minimize socio-economic dependence 
due to unsuccessful collective action. But then, for this to occur, it is not 
enough to remove the sources of individual oppression. They all must be 
members under common terms.
If the institutions of the republic had been designed by unenlightened 
individuals that do not know the love for public freedom, then the social 
order would be tainted by an original sin. We have no guarantee that this 
faulty design reproduces equal concern and receptivity to the claims of all 
members overtime.
Pettit’s alternative consists on a dual model of republican democracy. 
It presupposes a sufficient minimum of public disposition among the popu-
lation, supplemented with an invisible institutional hand that channels 
their more self-regarding incentives in the direction of the common good. 
This republican democratic model combines electoral democracy for the 
selection of representatives, with contestatory democracy for the control 
of political authorities. It is still highly institutional because it favors deli-
berative regulation over direct participatory deliberation. With this oppo-
sition Pettit defends the practical value of the automatic re-enactment of 
established norms and the reproduction of previous agreements, building 
up on a shared institutional culture.5
There are three additional requirements that determine the way in 
which the freedom status can be achieved:
Individualized control: all citizens have adequate channels to exercise 
contestation and influence on social organization.
Unconditionality: the terms of political power, procedurally and 
substantively, are not subject to external considerations or qualifi-
cations in its implementation. They are automatically enforced as 
a common will. 
Efficacy: this condition stipulates that the degree of public control 
over the whole political process should be such that all undesirable 
political outcomes could be accepted as a matter of “tough luck.” 
This tough luck test means that one has no reasonable grounds for 
5. Ibid., 264-269.
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resentment when the outcome is attributable to incompetence or 
culpable ignorance of fellow co-citizens, in their public or private 
roles, as long as the political apparatus is under shared equal 
control. 
When these requirements are satisfied we can affirm that the state 
has political legitimacy even if it falls short of realizing full social justice. 
These conditions identify the adequate normative standing that a poli-
tical authority must obtain when it organizes the lives of the citizens. As 
Pettit affirms, “the normative assumption is, on the one side, that the state 
ought to treat its citizens as equals and, on the other, that citizens are to 
be willing to accept this and to live on equal terms with one another.” And 
continues: “this intuition is intuitively compelling and it is not specific to 
the republican approach; it is endorsed in every plausible political philo-
sophy”.6 That is, there are no grounds for “idiotic” withdrawal within the 
state.
2. Distributive justice and self-respect
The republican conception is first and foremost a conception of demo-
cratic justice. Its main concern is the democratic distribution of political 
influence and the resources necessary to generate the personal attitude to 
use this power. It is therefore an almost purely procedural conception of 
justice as it does not pre-determine the substantive outcome of the demo-
cratic use of power. 
This republican conception of democratic justice derives social justice 
from a strong formal conception of political legitimacy. To some critics, 
this conflation would be inconsistent with the republican conception 
as they point that material inequalities also have an undermining effect 
on the perception of equality of political status among the citizenry. 
Therefore, they claim that democratic legitimacy must be supplemented 
with an independent conception of socioeconomic justice.7
6. Ibid., 132.
7. For instance, Fabian Schuppert, “Non-domination, non-alienation and social equal-
ity. Towards a republican understanding of equality.” Critical Review of International 
Social and Political Philosophy, 18 (2015) 440-455. Here the author defends that indi-
viduals should be protected from alienation from themselves induced form non-in-
tentional interactions in the social order. In my understanding, these would be largely 
included in the eye-to-eye condition.
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It can be argued, however, that these criticisms rely on a basic misun-
derstanding of the demands of the freedom-status. The public provision 
of this status is the goal of social life, and social institutions and resources 
should be designed in order to realize this goal among the citizenry. As 
many critics correctly identify, this implies a sufficientarian principle of 
distributive justice, measured by the eye-to-eye test. But although suffi-
cientarianism emerges as a non-comparative principle alternative to 
other egalitarian theories (“enough resources” as opposed to “same than 
others”), in this case its satisfaction is linked to an intrinsically relational 
condition. Passing the eye-to-eye test implies that the overall distribution 
of resources has no impact on the perception of equal dignity and civic 
status, and that material inequalities do not affect the disposition of the 
citizens to exercise their equal share of political influence. It implies, 
therefore, that inequalities must be socially approved. The margin of 
permissible inequalities may vary through cultural contexts. For instance, 
in a Free Buddhist Republic inequalities may have marginal impact on 
civic status while in the Free Nordic Republic they may be offensive, 
demanding strong redistribution and even the “leveling-down” of those 
indignant goods that threaten public equality. In sum, nothing in this rela-
tional-sufficientarian principle rules out strong limits to social inequality. 
But, what is really relevant for the realization of freedom-status is the 
implementation of an institutional order that prevents illegitimate conver-
sions of goods and resources into political influence.8 The isolation of the 
different social spheres, the blockage of illegitimate conversions, and their 
supervision by the political authority is what really demands the “tough-
-luck” test. In sum, there are not intrinsic criteria of distributive justice 
for the realization of freedom-status but only the strong requirement of 
blocking the interference of inequality into the democratic determination 
of the social order.
It is interesting to contrast this view with the well know Rawlsian 
liberal-egalitarianism. For Rawls equality and freedom are also the 
markers of citizenship and the building blocks of his Kantian construc-
tivism. They are not just formal or programmatic descriptions, since the 
basic rights and liberties are qualified by their “fair value” that entails their 
realistic realization. What is really interesting is that for Rawls citizens 
are conceived as participants in a joint social enterprise, entitled to a 
8. Adapting the classic terminology from Michael Walzer (Spheres of Justice. A Defence of 
Pluralism and Equality. New York: Basic Books, 1983).
Provided for Personal License use. Not for reproduction, distribution, or commercial use.
© 2016 Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia. All Rights Reserved.
Provided for Personal License use. Not for reproduction, distribution, or commercial use.
© 2016 Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia. All Rights Reserved.
Democracy for Idiots. Republicanism, Self-Alienation and Permanent Minorities 959
2016
Vol. 72
Fasc. 4
fair share of the social production. There is a very interesting and subtle 
contrast between Pettit and Ralws, because both condemn the degrading 
aspect of social dependence and welfare capitalism.9 On the republican 
side, social coercion generates rights and entitlements that are antithetical 
to beneficence and dependence. On the Rawlsian side, citizens are explicit 
social cooperators and, in addition to being equal citizens at the political 
level, the conditions for the achievement of self-respect are also extended 
to the comparative criteria that reward their involvement in social produc-
tion.10 Therefore, the “social bases of self-respect” are singled out by Rawls 
as the most important primary good and their social distribution should 
be constrained by the difference principle.11 This entails the assumption 
that not all citizens will feel their social belonging with the same intensity. 
Some will fit in the social system easier. They will find that it is shaped by 
their capacities and preferences in a larger degree than other collectives. 
But a just society must design its institutions to maximize the sense of 
social belonging and the due respect for the life projects of its less advan-
taged members. Although self-respect is a subjective attitude that cannot 
be socially distributed, the institutional environment may be designed to 
maximize its promotion and minimize its erosion. 
One particular case of institutional undermining of self-respect 
is through the perception of an unfair participation in the burdens and 
benefits of social cooperation. Rawls identifies two patterns of reactions 
that emerge when the strains of commitment are perceived as excessive: a 
resentful attitude that leads to frequent confrontation and violent revolt; 
and a sense of alienation that leads to the withdrawal from social partici-
pation.12
It is interesting to notice that these toxic effects on self-respect derive 
from the perception of an institutional state of affairs. It has a vertical 
dimension in the sense that it stresses the internalization of how one is 
being treated by the institutions. At the same time, it makes explicit the 
importance of the principle of publicity, which demands transparency on 
the public terms of social cooperation.13 Therefore, the perception of the 
strains of commitment should be based on objective assessments of inter-
9. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness. A restatement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2001), 135-140.
10. Ibid., 5-6.
11. Ibid., 59-60.
12. Ibid., 128-129.
13. Ibid., 121-122.
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personal comparisons, which rely on widespread institutional structures 
of public justification.
In contrast, Pettit’s conception of freedom-status as civic self-
-respect emphasizes the agential dimension over the institutional, since 
what actually matters is the efficient transformation of social resources 
into public freedom and not their distribution according to an external 
criterion. What really matters is the street level of horizontal interactions 
and the patterns of inter-subjective recognition that express a civic repu-
blican attitude. This is the precondition for the exercise of proper repu-
blican democratic authority. 
3. Permanent minorities, authorial democracy and self-respect
There are a number of structural limitations in Pettit’s Democratic 
Republicanism that may seem incompatible with the self-respect of 
permanent minorities but that, nevertheless, seem to pass the “tough luck” 
test of democratic acceptability. 
First, Pettit seems to underestimate the national –and therefore alie-
nating, character of the republic. This historical dimension of the political 
community is one of the recurrent blind spots for insiders because natives 
do not need to be naturalized. But, as we have seen, we cannot take the 
republican institutions as impartial creations conferred by an omniscient 
lawgiver. We should assume that they are the product of a self-correcting 
historical experience. Pettit relies on this cumulative dynamic to defend 
his preference for a concept of deliberative regulation that builds upon 
consolidated consensus and limits effective deliberation to unprecedented 
cases. Simultaneously, Pettit wants to distance himself from other corpo-
ratist conceptions of the nation, understood as a collective intergenera-
tional entity with national interest. In contrast, he defends the public 
interest of the demos, identified in aggregate terms, as the proper object 
of political influence.14 This subtle nuance may discard the most extreme 
forms of republican patriotism, but seems difficult to fully reconcile with 
the path-dependent inertia of his deliberative regulation. The criteria 
for the identification of the public interest emerge from this cumulative 
experience and, therefore, republicanism tends to create thick political 
cultures overtime.
14. Pettit, On the People’s Terms, 245-246.
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Additionally, one of the constitutive elements of the republican 
conception of legitimacy is the defense of shared institutions of public 
freedom. This expected loyalty and the virtue of republican patriotism is 
perfectly in line with a sustained duty of co-responsibility and identifi-
cation with the common good. This is the attitude that allows the appea-
rance of the republican public space, one that is only maintained through 
personal political implication. This predisposition and the values that it 
reproduces through the active participation in social institutions generate 
an understandable priority for the fellow citizenship. The extent to which 
this republican identity is compatible with a cosmopolitan conviction is a 
matter of balance. Pettit criticizes those conceptions of corporate natio-
nalism that sacrifice the wellbeing of its citizens for the continuity of 
the political community although he does not discuss the most frequent 
opposite case, the difficulty for national democracies to represent cosmo-
politan interests.15
Democratic deliberations tend to focus disproportionally on internal 
affairs and to weigh all events in function of the national interest. 
Consequently, republics constitute domestic publics that regard the rest of 
the world as permanent minorities. Active dissenters may understandably 
feel alienated from a political identity that is inherently biased against the 
claims of outsiders. For instance, negligence in the collective responsi-
bility for humanitarian and refugee crisis may deeply alienate cosmopo-
litan activists, but also permanent residents and other refugees. These may 
have to choose between integration as alienated permanent minorities or 
opt for self-alienation as permanent residents. The case of cosmopolitan 
and transnational allegiances is a deep source of strains of identity that is 
not adequately recognized in democratic republican terms. 
Pettit is perfectly aware of the gap between institutionalized political 
power and popular political influence. This chasm is explicitly reflected in 
his model of democracy, which opposes the dual dimensions of the people, 
as constituted people, incorporated in the institutions of the state as the 
organized agent of the citizenry; and as constituting people, expressed in 
the political forces and channels that exercise the political control of the 
state in a dynamic and creative way. The constituted people perpetuates 
the conservative identity of the republic, the constituting people brings 
15. Ibid.
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openness but both face structural limitations to incorporate some groups 
into the republican identity.16
Pettit acknowledges the intrinsic limitation of democratic republi-
canism to deal with persistent minorities and concedes that self-gover-
nment and self-determination as second best solutions for territorially 
concentrated minorities.17 This pragmatic solution can be defended as an 
alternative way to promote the good of equal freedom and civic dignity 
among groups systematically divided by a deep breach of understanding 
and communication and, in line with the interpretation held in this paper, 
consistent with the multiple realizations of the principle of expressive 
equality.
In his brilliant work on modern constitutionalism, James Tully shows 
how the main families of modern political justification ultimately rest on 
unarticulated conventions that still keep alienating women and minority 
cultures. Tully argues for an alternative tradition of complex constitutio-
nalism that incorporates alien bodies through accommodation instead of 
mandatory translation into the hegemonic categories of public reason. 
His arguments for a democratically shaped constitutionalism -instead of a 
constitutionally constrained democracy; find common ground with Pettit’s 
republicanism.18 Additionally, Tully defends that “two of the primary goods 
of constitutionalism are civic participation and the civic dignity that goes 
with it,”19 and that the recognition and accommodation of degrees of self-
-government constitute analogous and equivalent ways to promote these 
goods. Also that modern constitutionalism should undergo a “conceptual 
revolution,” and the first step in that direction is to recognize “the civic 
dignity of speaking in one’s cultural voice, and the corresponding civic 
indignity of speaking for others or of being compelled to speak in the 
dominant language and traditions of discourse.”20
Paradoxically, Tully remarks that social belonging is one additional 
good provided by modern constitutionalism and that this belonging is 
precisely more intense through the struggle for cultural recognition than 
when this is finally awarded.21 The cases that Tully presents imply struggles 
16. Ibid., 285-288.
17. Ibid., 211-218.
18. Ibid., 238.
19. James tully, Strange Multiplicity. Constitutionalism in an age of diversity. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 192.
20. Ibid., 34
21. James tully, Public Philosophy in a New Key. Vol. I. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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for self-government or differentiated citizenship in multicultural settings. 
They presuppose territorially concentrated groups that can engage in 
relevant public contestation. The problem of self-alienation in contrast, 
springs from scenarios where the dissenting individuals are territorially 
dispersed and have to face unreceptive majorities. 
The problem with republican democracy is that it cannot properly 
address this problem of globalized and complex democracies because 
it does not translate into our usual categories of domination and we 
cannot say that there is a group that intentionally exploits or margina-
lizes a minority. It is a case that would easily pass the “tough luck” test 
because the majority just happens to have a different set of constituted 
preferences and may lack the sufficient receptivity towards others.22 What 
is perceived as an intense problem by a minority cannot be brought about 
to the majority conscience without great effort, and therefore, does not 
qualify as common avowable interest.23 There is not sufficient discursive 
interaction because “not all recognize that all recognize a problem.”24 
Additionally, the background assumption in political philosophy is that 
“resident” is only a transitional condition in the way to full-membership 
as an integrated citizen, and not a proper political status.25
This deep breach affects dissenters, residents, and other persistent 
minorities that are territorially dispersed. They may show higher density 
in some neighborhoods, or establish networks and local organizations, 
but they generally live their day-to-day life among mixed populations. 
However, when these very networks and social movements fail to translate 
their claims to the democratic fora, then these minorities do not count as 
constituting people. They may feel that the vote is a useless tool, that exer-
cising their voice is a frustrating experience, and that exile is an option 
Press, 2008), 180-184.
22. For instance, disregarded as unreflective “moral stands,” as pointed out by John 
McCormick in “Republicanism and Democracy,” In: Niederberger, A. & Schink, Ph. 
(eds.). Republican Democracy. Liberty, Law and Politics. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2013), 105.
23. Philip Pettit, A Theory of Freedom, 156.
24. Ibid., 67.
25. For Pettit “All adult, able-minded, more or less permanent residents count as citizens, 
on this conception, not just those with the right to vote and stand for office.” In On the 
People’s Terms, 138. For instance, David Owen provides an exhaustive account of the dif-
ferent categories of migrants “in terms of civic marginalization, that is, marginalization 
relative to the norm of the national citizen.” In “Citizenship and the marginalities of mi-
grants.” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 16:3 (2013): 326.
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contingent on the existence of a matching hosting state, where they would 
still remain as residents. 
4. Permanent minorities, editorial democracy and self-respect
All things considered, in our diverse and complex democracies 
persistent minorities may fail to identify with the democratic exercise 
of authorial power. Pettit contemplates an auxiliary way to exercise 
democratic control over political power in complex societies, where it is 
difficult for the demos to track the translation of their authorial power 
to the policies finally implemented. In these circumstances where they 
cannot fully identify themselves as the authors, they can always act as 
editors of conflicting policies. But this editorial capacity is of limited use 
to persistent minorities. The purpose of these corrective mechanisms 
is to enhance the accountability of the government and of the different 
bodies of the instituted people, which must reflect the will of the consti-
tuting people as engaged citizens. We have already seen that the problem 
here rests on the previous formation of the democratic will that has to be 
implemented.
The other traditional avenue for the exercise of editorial power is 
through courts that protect the rights of minorities from abusive majorities. 
But this avenue does not really reflect the authorial power of the minorities 
or their influence in shaping the democratic will. Courts merely interpret 
or protect already recognized rights and prerogatives as framed in the 
legislature or as terms of international treatises recognized as law of the 
land. This act of legal recognition may also involve substantive authorial 
power by the demos that selects, imports, translates and adapts foreign 
standards and practices, as it is explained by Seyla Benhabib’s conception 
of cosmopolitanism as “democratic iterations.”26 But this, however, presu-
pposes an integrated democratic will, sufficiently responsive to the ius-ge-
nerative initiatives of activists and social movements.
 This way, through democratic iterations, cosmopolitan norms are 
translated into alternative but equivalent terms for other peoples. This 
very productive conception may also hide a correlative side-effect, namely 
that those that have no real influence in the democratic iteration of cosmo-
politan terms may feel doubly alienated from those standard citizens of 
26. Seyla BenhaBiB, Another Cosmopolitanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
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the republic that also are cosmopolitan subjects. These uneasy minorities 
would in contrast, self-identify in their passive dimension of subjects 
of human rights protection and as denizens of the world. All in all, this 
residual identity may be preferable to many persistent minorities than the 
strains of identification with the democratic consensus. The paper argues 
that when mandatory identification becomes a source of potential alie-
nation and resentment, voluntary self-alienation as a political status cons-
titutes a normatively acceptable alternative to national citizenship.
5. Equality, dignity and rights
On situations of disaffected groups and lack of identification with 
the political order the usual republican response is to display new institu-
tional avenues for incorporation. The opposite attitude, one that sponsors 
a greater tolerance towards non-citizenship, seems to rely on liberal anti-
-political values. Living in a republic as residents would grant those indi-
viduals a very robust sphere of negative rights and protections, consistent 
with the ideal of freedom as non-domination. But, in contrast to multi-
cultural citizenship, non-citizens would lack the legal tools to influence 
the terms of a demos. Richard Bellamy illustrates this opposition with the 
image of the city walls.27 
The liberal language of human or natural rights leaves the unprivileged 
outside the city walls, as mere petitioners for redress by the privileged 
within, who may deploy these self-same rights to deny any civic responsi-
bility for these others. The republican approach brings all right-claimants 
within the city walls, giving them access to the political mechanisms 
required to offer them redress.28
But by pressing the politization of rights and membership in republican 
terms, republican thinkers place themselves in a difficult position. On the 
one hand, they want to be maximally inclusivist, bringing in as fellow 
citizens all those residents and disaffected dissenters. On the other hand, 
by incorporating into the constituted people groups with a reluctant rela-
27. Richard Bellamy, “Rights, Republicanism and Democracy”, In: Niederberger, A. 
& Schink, Ph. (eds.). Republican Democracy. Liberty, Law and Politics (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 263.
28. Ibid.
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tionship with the political identity, republicans are devaluing the dignity 
they attach to the category of citizenship. 
Waldron nicely registers these opposing views when he reconstructs 
Arendt’s Athenian conception of political equality as an artificial persona 
conferred as a necessary condition for the creation of a specific political 
space.29 In contrast, the modern concept of citizenship and human dignity 
appears as the universalization of a status-term that grounds demands 
among us.30 While the first notion is entirely political, the second one 
emerges as a moral leveling up that “can be associated with a furious 
sense of one’s rights and a willingness to stand up for them as part of what 
it means to stand up for what is best and most important in oneself.”31 
The dilemma we face corresponds to a historical crossroad of these two 
conceptions. When highly intense minority views are diluted in an unre-
ceptive political space then political exit may be the coherent way to stand 
up for one’s self-respect. 
Our modern “idiotes” are recalcitrant insiders that by rejecting 
national identification, pose a novel challenge to the modern notion of 
the democratic state. We may answer to this question by granting them a 
non-national political persona in a global order of post-national states.32 
Alternatively, we may stick to our modern ideal of democratic equality 
by imposing mandatory citizenship. Developing a detailed account of the 
first proposal exceeds the limits of this paper so the discussion will explore 
the second argument.
6. Democratic equality and mandatory citizenship.
The case for mandatory citizenship is made by Helder de Schutter 
and Lea Ypi, in a paper awarded with the Brian Barry Prize in Political 
Theory (2015).33 Confronted with the growing phenomenon of qualifying 
settled neighbors that decline offers to acquire citizenship, the authors 
defend that long-term residents disrupt the political fabric of a just society 
29. Jeremy waldRon, Dignity, Rank & Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 20.
30. Ibid., 139.
31. Ibid., 145.
32. I explore this proposal in “Individual Membership in a Global Order: Terms of Respect 
and Standards of Justification,” Public Reason, 4:2 (2012): 92-118.
33. Helder de schutteR and Lea yPi, “Mandatory citizenship for immigrants.” British 
Journal of Political Science, 45:2 (2015): 235-251.
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and conclude that it the imposition of mandatory naturalization is compa-
tible with the ideal of democratic equality. Their paper presents two main 
arguments:
The fist just states that non-citizens are vulnerable to exploitation 
and contribute to the degradation of the labor market. The second argues 
that long-term residents ultimately parasite on social cooperation. The 
first one builds a strong case for the state duty to offer citizenship but 
it is less convincing in showing the strength of the duty to accept it, 
because it is constructed around the self-interest of the resident and on 
her perception of citizenship as a benefit, not as an obligation. The point 
makes more sense, for instance if mandatory citizenship also implies a 
system of compulsory voting, also favored by Pettit, so the most vulne-
rable would have a modicum of electoral influence.34 Pettit also supports 
compulsory voting in order to bring higher reliability and representativity 
to experiences of public consultation. This view, however, would fit more 
adequately among the “burdens” of citizenship instead of as a protection 
against domination. Mandatory consultation would not necessarily imply 
mandatory citizenship because effective consultation may require specific 
demographics -like input from children; that are not necessarily part of 
the enfranchised demos and have no electoral power.35
The second and more controversial case -which fundaments the bulk 
of their proposal, is worth a lengthier discussion. This argument ultimately 
holds that long-term residents are free-riders that take advantage of the 
commitment of the citizenry to maintain a stable political community 
over time. In particular, residents that share the obligation to obey the 
(coercive) law, that pay taxes, that lack adequate political representation, 
that are excluded for public positions, and that contribute to the general 
wellbeing to a certain degree, are nevertheless in a privileged situation 
because they do not serve in the military, they do not perform jury or 
electoral duties, and they are exempted from allegiance to the national 
34. Pettit supports this system in Australia, even if it is less than perfect (On the People’s 
Terms, 169 and 210 n.26).
35. Pettit supports experiences of mandatory consultation in Just Freedom, 147. However, 
we should keep in mind that Pettit not always uses the term “citizen” in its official 
sense (see n. 24 supra) but also a wider way, taken from Tully. This wider meaning is 
relevant for public consultation: “I take citizens in this discussion to comprise, not just 
citizens in the official sense, but all the more or less settled residents of a state who, 
being adult and able-minded, can play an informed role at any time in conceptualizing 
shared concerns and in shaping how the state acts in furthering those concerns.” On 
the People’s Terms, 75.
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identity and from the duty to defend its legacy against foreign criticism. 
Consequently, both authors conclude that long-term residents enjoy a 
disproportionate share of social benefits at the expense of an over-bur-
dened citizenry. Therefore, access to citizenship should be mandatory. 
The state has the obligation to offer it and the immigrant has the duty to 
comply with the requirements. 
Regarding the first argument, we may point out that it relies on very 
contextual circumstances and that different descriptions of rights and 
duties produce different assessments. Their following and more theore-
tical argument is more interesting for our discussion. It relies on what 
they dub as the All-Affecting Principle (AIF), which states that:
[A]ll those who repeatedly (significantly) affect others, have a duty to 
participate in a democratic process in which justifications for particular 
courses of action are advanced. The idea behind the principle is that 
one cannot constantly perform actions which exert influence on others 
or make use of common spaces without being prepared to join the civic 
political forums where practices that affect others are discussed and 
negotiated.36
In contrast to the more familiar All-Affected Principle (AF), this new 
formulation entails an obligation to share a political space of reasons, 
in particular, “it demands for the democratic politization of these rela-
tionships.”37 This single principle encapsulates two complementary argu-
ments: on the one hand, mandatory political inclusion allows the citizens 
to understand the concerns of the resident minority. On the other hand, 
through this demand of justification, minorities are exposed and familia-
rized with the general social view point.
Through this principle, the authors seem to conflate issues relative 
to national identity with matters relative to local conviviality. In parti-
cular, they identify scenarios of local conflicts to justify the participation 
in the official apparatus of formal institutional politics. Examples of local 
conflicts between residents and citizens may also provide more interesting 
opportunities for the implementation of deliberative-communicative prac-
tices in the neighborhoods, instead of translating the conflicts into the 
more constituted terms of national institutional politics. This is precisely 
the space in which now diluted minority reasons are less likely to affect 
36. Ibid., 243.
37. Ibid., 244.
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and influence the majority view. The resort to local examples is misguiding, 
as the authors know that there are many democracies in which residents 
are allowed to participate and vote in local politics, and that the kind of 
problematic interactions that they depict are better solved through actual 
discourse-friendly relationships among affected participants.38
 Additionally, minorities would rarely find significant channels of poli-
tical participation at the national level –at least while they still are a demo-
graphic minority. Their condition of irrelevant and permanent minority 
makes it difficult to pass the “tough luck test,” as their political demands 
may routinely find indifference at the national stage, when extracted from 
the interactive context where they arose. This lack of adequate repre-
sentation as full-and-equal citizens is precisely what justifies political 
resentment. Therefore, mandatory citizenship may very well backfire if 
the structural limits of the constituting people are not taken into account.
7. Democratic equivalence and self-alienation
Self-alienation, as the voluntary option for a status of residency, may 
do better at the “eye-to-eye test” than mandatory citizenship. In fact, the 
space of face-to-face relationships in neighborhood politics demands a 
different and specific set of political virtues and attitudes of tolerance 
and accommodation. Citizenship comes from city, and nationality from 
nation. The proposal of self-alienation implies relaxing the strong identa-
titarian demands of the constituted people in favor of the reinforcement 
of local levels of self-government and civic participation.
Self-alienation also allows for the political expression of detachment 
and dissidence as an alternative between frustrated irrelevance and sacri-
ficial exile. On the first case, compulsory identification with the national 
identity may justifiably fuel political resentment. On the exile alternative, 
it amounts to the adoption of a status of resident in a different country, 
and requires previous admission by a suitable state. Remaining in place 
while renouncing to the national identification, paradoxically, implies 
the enlargement of political space for the community. It habilitates novel 
forms of expression of dissidence and the adoption of alternative forms of 
hybrid membership, critical loyalty, cosmopolitanism or local, etc.
38. Pettit, A Theory of Freedom, 69-70.
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Self-alienation in the form of partial membership may also be an 
interesting solution for scenarios of hyper-pluralism in which radically 
different traditions have problems to converge and derive fully accep-
table consequences form a tenuous overlapping consensus. Alessandro 
Ferrara, for instance, defends a model of multivariate democracy in which 
the hegemonic majority helps identify conjectural interpretation of the 
foreign tradition that are compatible with the terms of public reason.39 
This is a move that presupposes an extremely receptive majority, fully 
embracing the duty of civility to persuade cultural minorities to share the 
core normative content, some through principled affirmation, some as 
modus vivendi, of the same multivariate democracy. This virtuous civic 
attitude, however, loses its point when naturalization is mandatory and 
residence is not an option anymore.
A different solution implies not the accommodation of the doctrinal 
tradition but the negotiation of the terms of membership. Andrew March, 
for instance, explores the difficulties of different Islamic traditions to 
reach a Rawlsian overlapping consensus.40 One of his suggestions implies 
the offer of partial citizenship, with specific bundles of rights and duties, 
which accommodate limited recognition of duties towards non-Islamic 
states, reformulations of secular authority in contractual obligations, 
and specific forms of loyalty and civic friendship. March is more opti-
mistic about finding a reasonably degree of overlapping consensus to 
back thicker forms of citizenship in strictly political forms of liberalism 
that restrict the discussion of these goods to the public sphere. This arti-
culation may be, however, less easy in more comprehensive varieties of 
republicanism. Then, the price for pluralist inclusion is to constraint the 
expression of a widely shared and substantive republican tradition. The 
option of self-alienated residency constitutes a compromise to be explored 
in cases in which resident minorities are willing to recognize and admit 
the legitimacy of the majority in keeping a historically rich way of life as 
long as they are not coerced into compulsory identification. 
The argument of equitative burden-sharing for compulsory citizenship 
is a matter of the proportionality between burdens and benefits, and these 
have to be contextually and specifically calibrated. In those cases where 
long-term residents enjoy a privileged situation as free-riders it makes 
39. Alessandro FeRRaRa, The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the renewal of 
Political Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
40. Andrew maRch, Islam and Liberal Citizenshi The search for an Overlapping Consensus 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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sense to increase the level of expected contributions to a degree similar 
to that of the general population. This may be done through access to full 
egalitarian status of citizenship. But it may be also done by restricting the 
basket of benefits for residents that decline the offer of citizenship. It is a 
mistake to presume that equality of status requires homogenization. What 
fairness demands, going back to Rawls, is the public justification of the 
strains of commitment and the avoidance of political resentment. What 
fairness really demands is not that the strains of commitment be iden-
tical but to be equivalent. This implies that different baskets of rights and 
duties may imply equally valuable contributions to the community, even if 
some are fully committed citizens and others well adjusted residents and 
dissidents.
A fair and reasonable compromise may accommodate resident status 
within a republican framework by recognizing that the host community of 
citizens feels a stronger political identification with the historical institu-
tional order in which they were shaped as members and that they contribute 
to shape in turn. This is a communitarian element implicit in the thicker 
versions of republicanism. This explicit recognition also accepts that even 
the most dynamic forms of constituting peoples operate within structural 
constraints that limit the political influence of permanent minorities and 
active dissidents, and that coerced political identification in some cases 
may justify reactions of social resentment. 
Consequently, it is possible to articulate a robust system of constitu-
tional protections embedded in stable status of residency, with equivalent 
baskets of burdens and benefits for those who have reasons to resent 
compulsory national identification. The main condition is that the status 
of residency should be protected from domination and dependency, and 
subject to public justification in equivalent terms. To that effect, a series 
of national and transnational courts and institutions could monitor and 
negotiate the equivalent terms of independent non-domination for resi-
dents, living along with citizens committed to the exercise of political 
control over state interference on national terms.
Conclusion
Our contemporary democracies face challenges of integration 
of increasingly diverse flows of populations across their borders and a 
growing hyper-pluralization within. This global horizon widely exceeds 
the traditional demands of homegrown multicultural citizenship. The 
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republican conception of democratic equality delineated by Pettit provides 
an attractive normative framework for self-respectful collective self-deter-
mination. We contend, however, that it is still seriously attached to the 
modern model of the territorial state, and to a homogenizing ideal of 
status equality. The paper examined this model and concluded that the 
terms of the demos would predictably generate constrains of identity in 
permanent minorities and that they would be reasonably justified when 
they exercise political idiocy and reject mandatory citizenship. 
Self-alienation, understood as a voluntary option for permanent resi-
dence, is a political status that may help accommodate dissenting and 
disaffected permanent minorities in equivalent terms to those of the tradi-
tional citizenship of our evolving democracies. Additionally, the recog-
nition of self-alienation as a political status also opens political space of 
our modern democracies to new avenues of contestation and to exercise 
exit from within.
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